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As long as this man was known only by his deeds he held untold
power over the imagination; but the human tnrth beneath the
terrors would, she knew, be bitterly disappointing.
Clive Barker, "The Forbidden" (1985:24)
Iq as Linda Ddgh has argued, "ostension [isJ . . . presentation as
contrasted to representation" ( 1995 :237'1,then folklorists should also
focus their attention on ostension beyond the two sub-forrns of the
phenomenon, quasi- and pseudo-ostension. Perhaps the reason forthe
current vogue in ostension studies is the result of an academic
cynicism: that only these forms of ostension actually exist. Another
problem lies in the subject matter of the quasi- and pseudo-ostension
studies, for they do not allow for any potential existence of other
fonns ofostensive behavior. One place where an alternative ostension
can be observed :N an active tradition is the cinema: the narrative
texts are presented as signifieds, rather than signifiers. Signifiers do
play their role in movies, but what is seen is given more emphasis
tttan what is said. Ddgh notes that ostension is an ideal type, which
is perhaps impossible to exist in any non-mediated form. However,
in contrast to quasi- and pseudo-ostension sfudies, dramatic pre-
sentatiotr, the "acting out" of narrative, can likewise be ostensive.
Unfortunately, folklorists do not talk to film scholars and conse-
quently seem ill-equipped to deal with narrative feature films. As
folklorist Bruce Jackson notes, "folklorists rarely discuss films unless
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they are overtly about folkloric subjects" (1989:388). To prove that
cinema is ostensive action, I shall use the L992 Bernard Rose horror
film Candyman as an example. Candyman not only demonstrates
that film is ostensive behavior, but also privileges the ostensive
debate within its diegesis.r
Candyman tells the story of Helen, a graduate student at the
Universlty oflllinois, who is researching urban legends. Specifically
her attention has focused on one particular legend, that of
"Candyman," a hook-handed monster who is supposed to come out
of a mirror when his name is said five times. Helen's disbelief in the
legend is challenged when the Candyman comes to her and seduces
her away fromthe land ofthe living to the land of rumour and legend.
Candymun and legend materials
Bruce Jackson, writing inthe Journal ofAmerican Folklore in 1989,
describes the work of folklorists who approach feature films thus:
"it's usually a matter of folklore in films, the equivalent of Folklore
in Faulkner or Folklore in Shakespeare things to be plucked out of
a context otherwise lacking folkloric moment" (1989:388). It has
been suggested that the most direct way for individual fiction films
to be considered as "folklore" is to follow some of the theoretical
writings that tie folklore studies to literature. Neil Grobman, for
example, has proposed that one must assess "how authors use folk-
lore in their writings" (1979: 17). To follow this procedure requires
the scholar to identify the author in direct contact with folklore and
its scholarly debates (1979: l8). The problem with this approach
when applied to feature length fiction films is that it reifies a debate
cinema studies has engaged in since the mid- 1950s: who is the author
of a film?
Candyman is based on a short story by British author and film-
maker Clive Barker. Barker's story, "The Forbidden," although it
lays the basic narrative framework for Candyman, differs from
Bernard Rose's film in many significant ways. Therefore, when we
assign roles (or blame) to either Barker or Rose, we need to consider
their actual contributions to the filmmaking procedure. For Barker,
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the "Cand5nnan" narrative in his short story is a "beauty and the
beast" variant, wherein a sociologist studying graffiti on a Liverpool
Council Estate is seduced bythe hook-handed demon. Rose keeps the
barest of bones from the Barker original, specifically the seduction
of Helen by Candyman and his offer to her of immortality, but
changes the context considerably. Helen is no longer a sociologist,
but, ifnot a folklorist, certainly researching folklore materials (urban
legends). This is not to say that Barker's Helen is not likewise
engaging in folkloristic research with her graffiti study, but the
difference is between Rose's blatant folkloristics and Barker's
implicit folkloristics. Although one could develop a study outlining
Clive Barker's use of folklore and folkloristic materials as a writer,
this essay will deal only with how Bernard Rose uses Barker's story
and adds the folkloristic materials in the film Candyman.
As I said, Candyman is a basic "beauty and the beast" story (AT
425) that replaces the monster with the "hook-handed killer" motif
from contemporary legendry. Candymatt is summoned, diegetically,
by reciting his name five times while looking in a mirror (a motifthat
has its analogue with the ritual of "Mary Worth" in the United States
and Northern Europe). Some of the contemporary legends in
Candyman are demonstrated visually, while others are rhetorically
presented-we are told them. We can examine these motifs by thus
dividing them. Those demonstrative motifs, which make up the
diegesis of the film, are not limited to this fusion of "beauty and the
beast" with "the hook-handed killer" and the ritual of "M ary Worth."
Other demonstrated contemporary legends include "Razor Blades
Found in Halloween Candy" (Candyman is presumably responsible
for that), "Child Emasculated in Public Washroom" (S 17 6),and even
thetraditional British legend of Gelert (83 3I .2). Other contemporary
legends are presented within the diegesis rhetorically (they are told
within the narrative): "The Hippie Babysitter," who cooks the child
instead of the furkey, and "Alligators in the Sewers," to name but
two.
The problem with this analysis is now that one has identified
these legends as being in evidence in the film, what does one do with
them? To call Candymen either an amalgamation or an enactment of
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contemporary legend does not do the film a service. Its sum is greater
than these constituent parts. However some folklore scholars are
content at leaving matters thus.
John Ashton notes that "a series offull and detailed studies ofthe
way in which such materials [folkloreJ enter into and influence the
creative process could tell us much about the workings ofthe literary
creator" (quoted in Grobman 1979:37). True, but this kind of
analysis does not begin to approach the meaning of Candyman If we
were to leave our analysis at the connection between folklore
materials and their representation within a particular text, in this case
a major motion pichrre, then we must ask of ourselves whether we
have capturedthe experience ofthe text. With regards to Candyman,
we have not even come close. Analysis of this sort, accurate though
it may be, denies the film its overriding power ffid, therefore, its
meaning.
Larry Danielson cornments that "pop,rlar cinematic art can both
promulgate and reflect oral traditional plots and their motifs in
contemporary circulation as well as the anxieties that create them"
(I979:219).If so, then what relationship does the Candyman/Ivlary
Worth legend have to contemporary anxieties? Robin Wood, in what
film studies considers a definitive piece on the horror filrn, notes:
"The Monster is, ofcourse much more protean, changing from period
to period as society's basic fears clothe themselves in fashionable or
immediately accessible garments" (L979: l4). 'Wood and Danielson
appear to 4gree, just with a different emphasis (and I would argue
that Wood's ernphasis is more directed). For Danielson, the genre
itself is reflective of societal stress (also echoed in Wyckoff 1993).
Wood would ?gr@, but refocuses attention not on the genre but on
the relationship demonstrated by the genre's dramatis personae: the
relationship between Monster and Victim.
The central relationship in Candyman is just that, between
Candyman and Helen. Although eroticized and voyeuristic, the
Helen/Candyman relationship can be reduced to the White
Woman/African-American Man sexual relationship.2 The anxieties
expressed by the film (and only the film, for in "The Forbidden"
Candyman's race is never expressed; neither is the race of the
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residents of the Liverpool Council Estate, which is the locus of the
story) seemto center onmale African-American sexuality as directed
towards white women. The hard-working, responsible people in the
film are all African-American. Helen herself demonstrates a distinct
preference for African-American companionship, from her research
assistant to her "romanc€" with Candyman. The 'ocontemporary
anxieties" theory, which I do not deny is valid and relevant, points to
a fear of white fetishi zation of Aftican-American culture.3 In the
most pejorative words possible, Candyman as cultural discourse
argues against "going native." The problem remains one of academic
focus: if we are talking about the cultural discourse of a corr-
temporary legend, or of a horror movie, then this kind of analysis is
particularly relevant, but only relevant for other scholars. We still
have not engaged with the fihn as experience.
What is Candyman?
Towards the end of 1994, a few years after the fihn was released in
cinemas and a few months afterthe film's appearEmce onhome video,
a discussion of Candyman-type legends appeared on the Internet's
Folklore Discussion List (Folkl ore@listserv.tamu.edu). To deal wittl
the responses we need some sort oftaxonomic system in order to deal
with the postings. I have used the following schema: if the responses
make reference to Candyman-type stories the poster has heard about,
but not experienced, I have classified them as legend texts; if the
poster actually tried the rite him- or herself, then I have classified
these stories as game texts.
Although the nirme Candyman given to the monster in both the
film and the short story is unique within this fictional diegesis,
Candyman has his analogue in the oft-collected "Mary Worth"
narrative (also known as "Mary Whales," "Blood Mary," or eventhe
"Virgin Mary"). One exirmple of the Candyman-as-legend type of
posting is the following: "My sister swore that if you stood in front
of a mirror at night in a dark room, that you could call up a vision of
'BloodyMary"'(Alicia lgg4,October 19; in other postings: "bloody
Virgin Mary" or "Mary Worth"). Taxonomically, what makes this
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narrative a legend is the utterance of the belief that by standing in
front of a mirror, some entity can be called forth in a narrative form,
albeig in this c:lse, as an abbreviated narrative.
Here is a transcript of the legend as it is presented in the film.
The speaker of the following legend text is an unnamed female
student at the university. The dialogue within the mirror diegesis is
presented here in italics to differentiate it from the storyteller's voice.
This is the scariest story I ever heard. And it's totally true.
I{appened a few years ago near Moses Lake, in Indiana. Claire
was baby-sitting for the Johnsons. And, th, Billy, pulled up on
his motorcycle. Now she wasn't even going out with Billy; she
was actually going out with Michael, for about six months, but,
ah, she always kinda . . . had the hots for Billy 'cause he was like
a bad boy. fuid Michael was . . . he was just so nice. So an) ilay,
she decides that tonight's the night that she's going to give Billy
what she never gave to Michael.
Claire: Have you ever heard of Candyman?
Billy: lfo.
Claire: Well, his right hand is sawn ofI He has a hook jammed
in the bloody stump. And f you look in the mirror, and
you say his name five times, he'll appear behind you
breathing down your neck. Wanna try it?
So Billy began. He looked in the mirror and he said:
Billy: Candyman. Candyman. Candyman. Candyman.
Claire: No one ever got past four. [Billy makes an itmorous
movement owards Claire.l Not here. Go downstairs.
I have a surprise for you.
She looked in the mirror. And I don't know why, but she said his
name the last time.
Claire: Candyman.
She turned out the lights. . . . And what he saw turned his hair
white from shock. Killed her. Split her open with his hook. And
then killed the baby too. And Billy got away. But soon after he
went $azy. My roommate's boyfriend knows him. @ose,
Candyman 1992)
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Bernard Roso, h writingthe screenplay for Candymen,develops
this kernel narrative into a full blown, fully performed contemporary
legend. Within the diegesis, "Candyttao" exists both as a legend and
as a g:rme. The film begins, after a voice-over by Candymat himself,
with a dramatized narrative of the "Candynan" story. Within the
narrative, wo, as the cinema audience, witness the gitme being played.
The sequence also demonstrates a play of narrative within narrative,
which I believe to be significant for Rose's use of cinema as
ostension. The sequence begins with a narrative told within the
diegesis; we see the listener, but are denied seeing the speaker. When
we are brought into the narrative world ofthe storyteller's narrative,
we are presented with an alternative diegesis, the world being told.
This second world, although maintaining verisimilitude with boththe
Candyman dregesis and our own world, negotiates its own plenitude
vis-d-vis the complete narrative being told within the Candyman
diegesis. This first narration of a "Candynan" legend, the audiences'
introduction to the tradition according to Rose's visual rhetoric, is
presented as a mini-movie within the larger movie. Furtherrnore, I
believe that Rose creates this mirror diegetic universe, this movie-
within-a-movie, because Helen (whom we have already identified as
the listener to the story being told) hears the narrative as a movie"
Rose is hereby creating a theoretical argument: that storytellers'
audiences visualize for themselves the narratives presented in, what
for ourWestern modern culfure would be, a "like a movie" analogue.
And therefore, for Rose, cinema, as a medium of narration, is linked
to traditional oral storytelling.
We can separate the legend from the game quite easily with this
narrative, and I believe it is important to do so for the sake of
analysis. For the purposes of this paper, the game of Candyman is
the activity of staring into a mirror and reciting his name five times.
The legends of Candyman are those stories told aboutpeople who try
the game and actually see the monster appear. The storyteller, in the
film, is telling a contemporary legend about someone she has heard
of playmg the "Candyman" game and the horrifying results that
occurred. If we draw a rough sequence of events at the narrative
and diegetic levels, certain patterns emerge: we begin with a
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representation of the narrative ("This is the scariest story I ever
heard."), which is followed by a presentation of the narrative (the
movie-within-a movie). Next comes a representation of the girme
("Have you ever heard of Candyman?"), which is followed by the
game's presentation ("Candyman. Candyman."). Especially note-
worthy is the mediation between the game's representation and the
game's presentation by the narrator herself ("So Billy began."). The
ierritory between legend and play becomes cloudy in the film,
reflecting the cloudy nature of the tradition the film is working from
(the Mary Worth gamelstories).
This brings us to discuss the game itself. In l978,Janet Langlois
published what has been considered the definitive paper on the ritual,
and in 1988, Bengt af Klintberg explored the game's European
variants. The rinral is also described in Mary and Herbert Knapp's
One Potato, Two Potato: The Folklore of American Children
(1976). By way of introduction to the Candyman-type game, the
Knapps describe it thus:
A child summons Mary Worth, alias Bloody Mary, alias Mary
Jane, by going into the bathroom alone at night, turning out the
lights, 
-staring 
into the mirror, and repeating "Mary Worth,"
sonfy but distinctly, forty-seven times. She comes at you out of
the mirror, with a knife in her hand and a wart on her nose.
(1976:242)
A slight variation is offered by Harriet Engle:
4 or 5 girls (boys didn't seem to be interested in this one) would
sit in a small circle under cover of someone's coat. It had to be
dark, of course. . We'd join hands, and call for someone
named "Mary Wolf." I forget the exact formula of the summons.
Usually one ofthe girls would shriek, and claim that "Mary" had
scratched her with one of her claws. The scratch mark was duly
ad.miredby the other players, and then the game would continue.
(1994, October 18)
We can generalize to some degree about some of the primary
characteristics of the phenomenon: the recitation of the name (be it
candyman, Mary worth, Mary wolf, etc.) a number of times,
darkness, and supernatural manifestation. The mirror motifwould be
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a secondary characteristic ofthe experiences, for as Engle noted, the
rite could occur within a darkened closet.
The descriptions of Mary's/Candyman's appearance also differ
tremendously depending on the spatial and temporal contexts in
which the g:tme is collected. Mary has been described as having
claws (Engle 1994) or as holdin g a knife and having a wart on her
nose (Knapp and Knapp L976). But Mary has also been described as
appearing in toto: "Mary would then appear in the mirror, behind
your reflection, with either good or evil intent, depending on who was
calling (or who was telling the story)" (Janice Del Negro, 1994,
October 20).4 It is Barker and Rose who introduce the motif of the
hook-handed killer into this tradition.
The meanir,g of play
Linda D6gh has recently noted that "horror movies [along with other
entertainment] are all harmless everyday games" (I994:l2I'r,. I
believe D6gh to be on the verge of a greater truth than perhaps she
realizes. If we compare the theoretical writings that have emerged
from discussing horror story narration and playing games, such as
"Mary Worth," with the involvement one has with a horror movie,
distinct analogues emerge.
Mary and Herbert Knapp argue that "flirting with fear is a way
of learning to control it, a way of learning to empathize with others
who are ftightened, and a way of embellishing one's life with a little
dramatic fiction" (L976:242). Bengt af Klintberg also agrees, with
specific regards to the ritual of Mary Worth:
"Black Madame" [a European variant of Mary Worth] may be
seen as a game with the help of which children investigate the
unknown and terriSing. It is reminiscent of their ghost stories,
where one finds the same greediness to experience fear.
(1988:155-156)
Both the Knapps and Klintberg agree that the importance of
experiencing fear is learning to control it (Knapp and Knapp
1976:242;Klintberg 1988:165). Bill Ellis has recently explored how
adolescents' experiences with a Ouija board are, in many respects, &
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more "grown-up" version of playing Mary Worth, ffid it should be
noted that Ellis's adolescents are the same audience demographic as
for horror movies like Candyman Ellis notes that 
'osuch mock-
ordeals [i.e. role-playrng gtrmes, Ouija boards, playing MaryWorthl
work only when they are set up carefully in terms of predictable
narrative structures, so that the youth could predict what was likely
to come next" (1994:79).
Ellis's comment is especially relevant for the study of cinema.
Hollyruood narrative cinema, as a highly coded and struchrred
narrative form, is predicated upon this qpe of predictability. Robin
Wood notes this principle of predictability: "normality is threatened
by the Monster" (1979:14). According to Wood, although the
Monster is a figure of horror and revulsion, we root for the Monster
in (usualtfl hisdestruction of our culture: "Central to the effect and
fascination of horror films is their fulfillment of our nighunare wish
to smashthe norrns that oppress us and which our moral conditioning
teaches us to revere" (1979:15). The resolution in horror cinema
refirrns society to normality, often as a result of the Monster's
destruction ild, at least rhetorically, supports the dominant world
view. Ellis notes, with regards to adolescents' Ouija rituals,
This kind of face-to-face confrontation with evil has much in
cornmon with teens' desire to reach Satan, only to taunt and
reject him after confirming traditional religious values. Exorcism
subjects zupernatural forces to human will, and along the way
confirms fundamentalist values. (1 994 :85)
Horyor cinema, then, appears to follow the same functional patterns
as Ouija boards for adolescents and Mary Worttr games for pre-
adolescents: we have a predictable outcome in a set, bounded
narrative, which, as frightening as the ride may be, will end in
approximately ninery minutes or so. A movie, specifically a hoffor
*orri., confonns to Klintberg's "secure and handleable framework"
(1938:165) in which the individual hopes to experience as much fear
as the cinematic storyteller can deliver. Iq as Ellis notes, such forms
of play enact'teens' belief and [allowJ them to participate directly
in myth" (1994:62),then it is not too far a stretch to conclude
that eng4ging in horror cinema, specifically horror movies about
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contemporary legend, allows the audience to engage directly with
legend. This engagement is, I argue, a form of ostension.
Ostension
Diegetically, Helen experiences two forms of ostensive behavior, the
quasi- and the pseudo-ostension. Each of these I shall deal with at
length. Within the context of the university environment hat Helen
works in, she comes across another potential informant of the
Candyman story. It appears that Ruthie-fean, a resident in the
Cabrini Green housing project that is the geographical focus of the
Candyman stories, ws murdered by Candyman himself a few weeks
earlier. The residents of the housing project attributed her rnurder to
Candyman. Helen's inforfiuult, a woman in the janitorial deparhnent
of the university, tells the story thus:
Kitty: Well all I know-it was there was some lady, in her
tub, and . . . and she heard a noise.
Helen: Do you remember her name?
Kitty: I think her name was Ruthie-Jean . . . . And she heard
this banging and smashing like somebody was trying to
make a hole in the wall-so Ruthie call 911 and she
said somebody coming through the walls. And they
didn't believe her.
Henrietta [friend ofKit$'sl: They thoughtthe lady was uazy.
Right?
Kitty: Mm-hmm. So she called 911 again and they still didn't
believe her. But when they finally got there she was
dead.
Helen: Was she shot?
Kitty: No. IJmm, she was killed with a hook. Sch'tz [-slicing
movement with her handl Yeah.
Henrietta: It's true. Yeah, it is. I read it in the papers.
Candyman killed her.
Kitty: Yeah, but . atl . . I [wink at HelenJ don't know
anything about that [dirty look to Henriettal. @ose,
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In researching the story further, Helen discovers that her own
condominium wix originally built as a housing project, like Cabrini
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Green" and her own aparmrent's layout mirrors that of Ruthie-fean's
aparftnent. One particular aspect is that the mirrored medicine
cabinet in Helen's bathroom is easily removed and leads directly to
the apartnent next door. If, as Helen proposes, Cabrini Green has the
same sort of layout as her own building, then what happened to
Ruthie-fean is fully explainable: the killer (or killers) were inthe next
aparfinent ildo in coming through the passageway that linl$ the two
bathroorns, appeared to be coming right through the mirror. They
find Ruthie-fean, kill her, and the legend continues.
Helen' s initial hypothesis about Candyman and by extension who
kined Ruthie-Jean is quasi-ostension: "the observer's interpretation
of pazzhng evidence in terms of narrative tradition" (Etlis
198-9:208).6 The residents of Cabrini Green believe , a priori, in the
Candyman legend, ild the events that lead up to the murder of
Ruthie-Jean are then seen as proof of that belief. Discovering
folkloristic arguments applied properly in a mainstream fiction
movie, although exciting for insiders (in this case folklorists), is still
no indication ofactual knowledge offolkloristic scholarship. The use
of quasi-ostension is easily explained as an accidental fluke. Any
nurnber of movies and television shows explore seemingly para-
normal phenomenon, but end up giving a rational explanation for
the events themselves. ft is quite possible that screenwriter and
director Rose was following a standard generic cliche and is unaware
that quite accidentally he is giving a demonstration of quasi-
ostension.
Classical Hollyvood narrative is the industrial norrn of feature-
length, fictional, narrative cinema, and it is a narrative tradition that
Candyman unsurprisingly uses.
In the classic narrative, events in the story are organised around
a basic structgre of enigma and resolution. At the beginning of
the story, an event may take place which disrupts a pre-existing
equilibrium in the fictional world. It is then the task of the
narrative to resolve that disruption and set up a new equilibrium.
The classic narrative may thus be regarded as a process whereby
problems are solved so that order may be restored to the world of
the fiction. . . . The "realist'' aspects of the classic narrative are
overlaid on this basic enigma-resolution structure, and typically
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operate on two levels: firstly, through the verisimilitude of the
fictional world set up by the narrative and secondly through the
inscription of human agency within the process of the narrative.
(Kuhn 1992:2L2\
This interplay of "reality" and quasi-ostension fits neatly into the
schema of classical Hollyvood narrative: we begin with the enigma
that a contemporary legend is walking around the corridors of a
Chicago housing project, ild it is believed by the local residents that
this legend was responsible for the murder of a local resident.
Through 'the inscription of human agency," Helen, we are able to
resolve the enigma, ffid Cabrini Green returns to a state of (relative)
equilibrium.
The explanation that Helen discovers about who killed Ruthie-
JearU and by extension the mystery surrounding the Cabrini Green
residents' belief in Candyman, while possibly under the follow-
through narrative of the quasi-ostension position, actually reveals
itselfto be pseudoqstension: a local gang lord has taken the name of
Candyman, carrying a hook and all, and has been terrorizng the
project's residents. Pseudo-ostension is the "imitating [ofl the
outlines of a known narrative to perpetuate [sicJ a hoa:r. . . ." (Ellis
1989:208); knowing the belieftraditions of an area allows one, if so
inclind to terrorize that community by exploiting those very
traditions. Just as Rose's use of quasi-ostension may in fact be
accidental and more the result of generic conventions than academic
intent, so too can Rose's use of pseudo-ostension be considered a
product ofthe genre's conventions. After all, how many episodes of
the old cartoon "scooby Doo" ended with pseudo-ostension? The
"rational and scientific" explanation of paranormal events are
frequently resolved by demonstrating the operation of a pseudo-
ostensive activity.
The pseudo-ostension argument, in the context of contemporary
narrative filtnmaking, can be seen :Ls the logical result of quasi-
ostension. Il as film studies would have us accept, so-called classical
Hollyvood narration is centered on the resolution of a single enigma,
then quasi-ostension is perfectly suited to this narrative form. The
audience assumes the existence of an alternative explanation to the
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paranormal one proposed bythose who experienced the phenomenon
(quasi-ostension), and the logical solution to that enigma (as
demanded by classical Holllnvood narration) would then be of
someone exploiting a supernatural belief tradition in order to
perpetrate a hoor (pseudo-ostension). Therefore, the asssertion that
Bernard Rose's Candyman rntelligently weaves its narrative through
a series of contemporary folkloristic arguments (ostension) does not
entirely hold water when taken in context of the industrial mode of
Hollyroood narrative production. What folklorists could identi$ as
ostension in contemporary Hollywood horror movies is in achrallty
nothing more than the very conventions Hollywood has always used.
Or rather that would be the case if the pseudo-ostensive argument
ended the film. It doesn't; it only brings us halfway through the
movie.
Ddgh notes that "ostensive action, that is, the showing of an
action by showing the action itself or by another action, might be
recognised by some people as acting, either in organised (theatrical
or other) or casual forms" (Degh 1995 :239). If so, then those same
people should recognize cinema as ostension too. In a movie,
narrative is not represented (although diegetically it may be, as in the
case ofthe Candyman story above); it is presented. We are not told,
"fohn picked up a knife;" we are shown lohn picking up a knife.
Irt me return to the Candyman narrative cited earlier and break
the film down by shots. Excluding the Candyman voice-over and the
opening credits ofthe film, the movie opens in a close-up of Helen's
face. She is listening to an unseen woman's voice as the first few
words of the above transcribed narrative are spoken. We are
presented with a cutT into the diegetically presented narrative. With
a sudden and visually jarring technique that violates the Hollyvood
code of continuity editing,t *r are in a different narrative space, and
we can negotiate this space only with the voice-over narrative we
hear. What begins as representation,the telling of "the scariest story
I've ever heard," becomes a presentation of the narrative itsell
sflistically returning to the continuity of editing previously violated.
Here, Rose is negotiating between two forms of legend telling, that
of oral storyte[ing and that of ostension. As we conclude the voice-
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over narrative, we have a slow dissolvee to a close-up of the young
woman telling the story. A cut occurs to a running tape recorder; then
a third shot follows showing Helen listening to the storyteller
conclude her story. In cinematic terms, we have a violation of the
codes of continuity editing; we are not given an establishing shot until
the very last line of the woman's narrative. This jarring and self-
conscious violation of the codes of classical Hollyvood cinema can
be seen as further underscoring Rose's understanding of how
ostension operates.
However, as Degh further argues: "The complete system of
theatrical signs maintains this specific duplicity in professional
theater (fihn, television) and continually reminds the audience that
what takes place on the stage is not the showing of reality, not
presentation, but representation, the imitation of a real or imagined
reality" (1995:239). Returning to our current argument, Degh's
position would rnake my own argument invalid: cineffi&, as a
theatrical sign, is representation, not presentation and, therefore,
cannot be considered ostensive action. For Degh, ostension is the
confusion of what Katherine Young calls "taleworlds" (Young
quoted in Wyckoff 1993:3-4) and reality, which would appear to be
supported by Ellis in his focus almost exclusively on matters of
quasi- and pseudo-ostension. If movie audiences confused the repre-
sented images with reality and believed all that they saw to be true,
they themselves would be operating under a system of quasi-
ostension. But as Bordwell and Thompson note, for some film theor-
ists, "cinema's power lies in its ability to present a recognizable
reality" (1936:147, emphasis added). Cinema is an analogue to
reality, not its replacement. And when audiences react to fantasy
cinema (horror movies, for example), they react not to a confusion of
the represented image with reality, but to the presentation of images
as cultural discourse.
Like Ellis's Oujia board players and Langlois's and Klintberg's
Mary Worth participants, horror movies function as a means to
reproduce contemporary anxieties through a system of presented
signs. Iq as follows from D6gh, fiction narrative cinema is not the
presentation of reality, butthe representation ofreality (and of course
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it is), how does the ostensive argument fit in, other than that horror
*o.rir, (in this case) would then be pseudo-ostensive action? The
answer lies in the ritual aspect of cinema, a dynamic that horror
movies particularlY exPloit.
Walter Evans sees the connection. He noted, back in the mid-
1970s, that "the adolescent who squirms and perspires his way
through a good monster movie participates in an imaginative
.*prri.nce ir *uny ways incredibly close to the complicated and
detailed initiatory practices of premodern peoples around the world"
(1932:135) nfifrough Evans's article is more concerned with
analogues |etween "premodernpeoples"' initiation images and horror
movie images, he not.r that "a powerful experience of such images
[as found in horror moviesJ alone can cause changes in personallty
and behavior" (1982:L41). Evans continues,
premodern initiates themselves both participate in and some-
times (like their moderncounterparts) merely witness ceremonies
which scholars characteristically refer to as 
"dramas" and
"scenarios," representations whose effect and function, so far as
is possible tojudge, seem to remarkably parallel those of monster
movies. [1982: 14lJto
Evans seems to contradict Degh; it begins to appear that the
representation can have a similar effect on the viewer as if the image
were actually presented. If that is so, and I firmly believe it to be,
then because ofthe nature ofthis strong identification with the screen
image, representati on functions as presentation for the horror film
audience. Therefore, this identificatory process, albeit contentiously,
brings forth an alternative to the pseudo- and quasi-ostension
arguments that I choose to call cinematic ostension'
Conclusion
Candymanis a mainstream, Hollywood horror film, that in addition
to thi legions of the genre's fans, has captured the attention of a
numbet of foklorists. The reasons for this attention are fairly
obvious: the movie is about contemporary legends; it intelligently
engages inmany ofthe current debates contemporary legend scholars
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are engaged in; it is a well acted, well produced piece of movie-
making; it is actually a "scary" horror movie (itself a rariry); etc. But
more importantly, the filtn engages in the issues surrounding
ostension with regards to the film's diegesis. It also offers up an
alternative to the pseudo- and quasi-ostension arguments that
dominate our discipline. Images can have an impact on the human
mind with the silme intensity as participation in similar activities.
That being so, cer0ain forms of representation can have the same
individual impact as presentation itself. Comparing the horror film to
other adolescent rites like playing with a Ouija board or pre-
adolescent rites like Mary Worth games creates an analogue betrn'een
cinema and ritual; the watching becomes as inclusive as the partici-
pating. The difference seems to be, although perhaps one ofbegree,
certainly one of p ermanence : as Donna Wyckoff noted, "participiting
in the legend process may be a way ofdoin gsomethingwithoutdoing
anything that has overt, permanent consequences" (1993 :27). Going
to the movies, entertaining though it may be, has larger psycho-social
impact with regards to the film's position within the legend process,
and one way that process affects us is ostensive.
Notes
t Diegesis: In a narrative film, the world of the film's story. The
diegesis includes events that are presumed to have occurred and actions
and spaces that are not shown on screen @ordwell and Thompson
1986:385).
2 Candyman is black.
3 Further ethnographic research would be applicable here: docu-
menting how both African-American and Caucasiatt audiences respond
to the film.
n 6 fascinating variation on Mary's appearance, and that for me
ind"icated the creative genius of children, is related in another posting:
"The color she appears will indicate herjudgement of you. Blue = you -.
good and she will protect you from harm, white - she will haunt you; red
- she'svery angry! and will murderyou" (Nancy Babb |gg4,October 20).
sAlthough this passage closely resembles acollected legend, we have
to remember that this was written by Rose, consciously trying to mimic
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impromptu storytelling. I think the verisimilitude he achieves is
impressive.
6 As Bill Ellis also notes, "In many cases, this act [quasi-ostension]
matches what David Hufford terms the 'cultural source hypothesis': only
a person who believes in a concept will actually experience it. . .
(1989:208).
7ecrfur instantaneous change from one framing to anothert' (Bordwell
and Thompson 1986:3 84).
8 "A system of cutting to maintain continuous and clear narrative
action" @ordwell and Thompson 1986:384).
s "A transition between two shots during which the second image
gradually appears as a superimposition until the two are evenly blended,
and then the first image gradually disappears" @ordwell and Thompson
1986:385).
r0 If we then compare this with Wood's thesis that horror films are
ideologrcally subversive to the current hegemony, then, regardless of the
refirrn to normalcy that classical Hollyvood narrative demands, the call-
ing into question of this hegemony is enough to allow a subversive voice
(Wood 1979 passim).
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